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Wearable Evidence: Why The Pennsylvania Judiciary 
Should Require A Warrant To Search Wearable 
Technology 
Pat Augustine* 
INTRODUCTION 
Wearable technology has revolutionized the lives of those who wear them.1 
New digital devices enable consumers to easily collect mass amounts of data 
pertaining to various aspects of their lives simply by wearing a watch, armband, or 
shirt.2 Whether they are recording health statistics with their Fitbits,3 sharing pictures 
through Google Glass,4 or making calls from their Apple Watches,5 wearable 
technology has allowed consumers to store, collect, and share information more 
conveniently than ever before.6 While shopping for such cutting edge technology,7 it 
is unlikely that consumers are considering the implications it might have when they 
encounter the police. 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Staff Editor, University of 
Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law and Policy. 
1 See Katherine Saphner, Note, You Should Be Free to Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk: Applying 
Riley v. California to Smart Activity Trackers, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (2016) (describing wearable 
technology as an “extension of the wearer”). 
2 See, e.g., Spela Kosir, A Look at Smart Clothing for 2015, WEARABLE TECHNOLOGIES (Mar. 23, 
2015), https://www.wearable-technologies.com/2015/03/a-look-at-smartclothing-for-2015/. 
3 See, e.g., Fitbit Charge, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/charge (last visited Aug. 26, 2016). 
4 See, e.g., Google Glass, GOOGLE, https://developers.google.com/glass/develop/gdk/reference/ 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2016). 
5 See, e.g., Apple Watch, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/watch/more-to-love/ (last visited Aug. 26, 
2016). 
6 Tristan M. Ellis, Note, Reading Riley Broadly: A Call For a Clear Rule Excluding All Warrantless 
Searches of Mobile Digital Devices Incident to Arrest, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 463, 487 (2015) (citing Zara 
Stone, SmartWhat? Smartwatch. Just, Why?, ABC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
ABC_Univision/smartwatch-whats-deal-web-connected-wrist-candy/story?id=20168783 (discussing the 
ease of access to messages, applications, and other data on a smart watch)). 
7 See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and 
Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 31 (2015) (discussing both 
fitness applications and other uses of wearable fitness tracker devices). 
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The success of wearable devices has been incredible.8 Experts estimate that the 
market for wearable technology is currently worth around $14 billion, a valuation 
that is expected to double by 2020.9 More significant than the success of the industry 
is the growing interdependent relationship between consumers and wearable 
technology,10 and the value of information stored on such devices.11 For example, 
wearable technology may take the form of a bracelet or watch12 and can be worn 
throughout the day and night.13 The device follows the consumer closely, collecting 
data about the consumer’s every move,14 painting a picture of everything that 
happens to the consumer throughout their day.15 Considering that someone may 
automatically put on their smart watch as a part of their daily routine, they may not 
be thinking of any legal ramifications which may follow. The consumer may not 
realize that their device essentially serves as the perfect eyewitness that can be 
seized, searched, and used against the consumer in court. 
The law already recognizes the importance of information collected by 
wearable technology by requiring warrants to search similar sources of 
information.16 The United States Supreme Court has held that the type of information 
stored on wearable technology is part of the consumer’s “virtual home”17 and should 
                                                          
8 See Paul Lamkin, Wearable Tech Market To Be Worth $34 Billion By 2020, FORBES (Feb. 17, 
2016, 9:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paullamkin/2016/02/17/wearable-tech-market-to-be-
worth-34-billion-by-2020/#78e0658c3fe3 (discussing the growth potential in the wearable technology 
industry). 
9 Id. 
10 See Saphner, supra note 1, at 1690–91 (citing Sara M. Watson, Stepping Down: Rethinking the 
Fitness Tracker, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/ 
hacking-the-fitness-tracker-to-move-less-not-more/380742 (claiming that the author’s Fitbit was an 
“extension of [her] awareness of distance, of quantified movement through space”)). 
11 Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Towards Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 127 (2014) (discussing the private 
nature of the information collected by wearable technology and its value to insurers, creditors, and 
employers of the wearer). 
12 See, e.g., Samsung Gear S2, SAMSUNG, http://www.samsung.com/us/explore/gear-s2/ (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2016); Up2, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/store/buy/up2 (last visited Sept. 1, 2016). 
13 See Saphner, supra note 1, at 1690–91. 
14 Peppet, supra note 11, at 88 (explaining that these devices count every step the wearer takes). 
15 Antigone Peyton, A Litigator’s Guide to the Internet of Things, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 14 
(2016) (explaining that a litigant’s Fitbit was used to gauge her daily physical fitness levels after an 
accident). 
16 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (detailing the private nature of the types of 
information held on cellphones such as pictures, location information, and addresses). 
17 Ellis, supra note 6, at 469–70 (describing the collection of information as the user’s “virtual 
home”). 
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be entitled to a wide degree of privacy.18 The law is unsettled as to what degree of 
protection the Fourth Amendment affords to consumers who encounter police while 
in possession of wearable technology.19 For example, it is unclear whether police can 
search through an arrestee’s Fitbit data or the information stored in their smart watch. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that law enforcement must obtain a warrant 
before searching an arrestee’s cellphone,20 it has not yet considered other forms of 
wearable technology.21 In a recent Pennsylvania trial court case, the Lancaster 
County Court of Common Pleas discovered that the information on a woman’s Fitbit 
may have invalidated her rape claim.22 In the investigation of the rape, police 
discovered the alleged victim’s Fitbit, which revealed numerous inconsistencies in 
her testimony.23 This case has brought to light the search and seizure implications 
that can result if it is the defendant, rather than a victim, whose device is searched. 
This Article examines the issue of search and seizure law in Pennsylvania as it 
pertains to wearable technology. Part I provides a survey of existing search and 
seizure law in the digital age, including the erosion of privacy interests. Part II 
discusses how Federal and Pennsylvania courts have exhibited shared concerns for 
privacy in the digital age, but stresses that the former has diminished privacy interests 
while the latter has not. The role of changing technology is included in this 
discussion. Part III considers precedential, historical, and policy reasons why the 
Pennsylvania judiciary should require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before 
searching wearable technology, and predicts that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
will uphold this requirement if it is imposed by lower courts. 
                                                          
18 See generally Peppet, supra note 11. 
19 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 489 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not secure any general 
right to privacy and cautioning that protections could erode in the future). 
20 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (explaining the “privacy interests at stake” when searching a cellphone). 
21 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 491 (explaining that the Supreme Court has laid the ground work for 
mobile devices but has not had occasion to deal with one other than a cellphone). 
22 See Myles Snyder, Police: Woman’s Fitness Watch Disproved Rape Report, ABC 27 NEWS 
(June 19, 2015, 2:03 PM), http://abc27.com/2015/06/19/police-womans-fitness-watch-disproved-rape-
report/; see also Commonwealth v. Risley, Criminal Docket: CP-36-CR-0002937-2015 (Lancaster Cty., 
Pa., printed Nov. 16, 2015) (an alleged victim’s claim of sexual assault was undermined by discovery of 
her Fitbit at the scene, she was subsequently prosecuted). 
23 Id. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVII – Spring 2017 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2017.197 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE DIGITAL WORLD 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.24 
The constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure are firmly 
rooted in the “principles of humanity and civil liberty.”25 The protections established 
by the Fourth Amendment provide a baseline for which state constitutions may 
expand upon, but may not encroach.26 To that end, the Pennsylvania Constitution has 
a long history of affording its citizens increased protections against governmental 
intrusion than the protections afforded by the federal government.27 Pennsylvania 
has tied the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures to the implicit 
right of privacy.28 Conversely, the same right to privacy that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution has expanded has been eroded under the Federal constitution.29 
The robust protections afforded by the Pennsylvania Constitution have not been 
met on a federal level. Over time our nation’s Supreme Court has held that more and 
more situations do not mandate the exclusionary rule as a constitutional remedy.30 
For example, the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution allows for a 
“good faith exception”31 which the Pennsylvania Constitution does not.32 Similarly, 
the Pennsylvania Constitution limits the third-party exception that the Fourth 
amendment allows for government searches.33 All in all, the reluctance of 
Pennsylvania courts to adopt the same exceptions that the Federal courts have 
                                                          
24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PA. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
25 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897). 
26 Commonwealth v. Henderson, 437 A.2d 387, 390 (Pa. 1981). 
27 Commonwealth v. Gayle, 673 A.2d 927, 931 n.9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 672 A.2d 826, 829 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 
1991). 
28 Commonwealth v. Moore, 928 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (a prisoner had no Fourth 
Amendment or Article I, Section 8 right to privacy in his non-privileged prison mail); Commonwealth. v. 
Viall, 890 A.2d 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (unreasonable expectation of privacy in objects recovered from 
a common area in the back seat that was not shielded from view of the many others occupying the same 
small space); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979). 
29 Louis A. Smith, II, Pennsylvania’s Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Survey of its Interpretation 
in the Context of Search and Seizure and Electronic Surveillance, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 557, 562 (1993). 
30 Id. 
31 United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
32 Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896. 
33 DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1292. 
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adopted shows a clear difference in which interests each constitution seeks to 
advance.34 
Though an individual’s right to privacy in Pennsylvania is fundamental, courts 
have held that in certain situations, it can be abridged.35 These situations exist where 
there is a government interest that is so compelling, it warrants the diminishment of 
one’s right to privacy in order to achieve some greater societal objective.36 The 
determination of whether individual privacy rights trump the interests of society as 
a whole involves the balancing of both interests by the court.37 
The constitutional right of privacy is significant, however it is not unqualified.38 
Accordingly, one instance where the U.S. Supreme Court has held that state interests 
trump an individual’s expectation of privacy is in the context of arrest.39 When there 
is probable cause to arrest someone, that person has a diminished expectation of 
privacy.40 The government’s interest in preventing the destruction or concealment of 
evidence and maintaining the arresting officer’s safety outweigh an arrestee’s 
expectation of privacy, and a search incident to arrest is an exception to the warrant 
requirement.41 Though the scope of this exception has been historically disputed 
across jurisdictions,42 the arresting officer maintains the right to search the arrestee 
and the area within their immediate control.43 
A. From Riley v. California Onward 
There is tension between the slow pace at which the law adapts and the rapid 
development of technology.44 The U.S. Supreme Court is cognizant of advancing 
                                                          
34 Smith, supra at note 29, 567–68. 
35 Pa. Soc. Servs. Union, Local 688 v. Commonwealth, 59 A.3d 1136, 1145 (Pa. Commw. 2012). 
36 Id. 
37 Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 1993). 
38 Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Center, 609 A.2d 796, 800 (Pa. 1992). 
39 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 
(1914)). 
40 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011). 
41 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
42 Cf. Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981). 
43 Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763); accord Commonwealth v. Bess, 382 
A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. 1978). 
44 Ellis, supra note 6, at 467–68 (explaining that by the time a case has reached upper level appellate 
review, the technology in question is often obsolete). 
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technological developments,45 and the nefarious purposes for which law enforcement 
may use them to see inside the private lives of those suspected of wrongdoing.46 The 
Court’s sudden rush to protect privacy interests in the wake of rapidly changing 
technology conflicts with the historical degradation of privacy interests in federal 
search and seizure law.47 The Court’s shift is likely the result of the widespread use 
of technological advancements and their importance in everyday life.48 With this 
progressive perspective,49 the Supreme Court in Riley v. California examined the 
issue of whether the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a 
warrant before searching a suspect’s cellphone.50 The Court accepted that cellphones 
are large digital data storage devices, the likes of which have never been seen.51 It 
acknowledged that private information is regularly stored on cellphones and 
therefore deserves protection.52 The Court explained that the mass and quality of 
information stored on a cellphone is more akin to that which is stored in a house than 
anything that a person would carry around with them.53 In doing so, the Court 
reasoned that it is “a totally different thing to search a man’s pockets and use against 
him what they contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may 
incriminate him.”54 The Court did not stop at likening the cellphone to a house, it 
explained that a search of a cellphone would typically expose much more 
                                                          
45 Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (When examining police use of thermal 
imaging on the home, the Court explains that “the rule [the Court] adopt[s] must take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development”) (emphasis added); see also Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the government may 
develop ways to reproduce documents in court without “removing papers from secret drawers”). 
46 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (In the context of 
wiretapping, Justice Brandeis discusses the future of police intrusion in stating “our contemplation cannot 
be only of what has been but of what may be. The progress of science in furnishing the Government with 
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping”) (emphasis added). 
47 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 466 (discussing the continued expansion of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement and suggesting Riley is a break from this trend). 
48 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (explaining that cellphones are a “pervasive 
and insistent part of daily life”). 
49 Ellis, supra note 6, at 467–68 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)). 
50 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
51 Id. at 2490 (discussing storage capacity and explaining that people carry large amounts of data 
on their cellphones and that ordinarily a person does not carry an expansive collection of records like this 
in document form). 
52 Id. (discussing that a simple search of a cellphone’s internet history can reveal a person’s most 
private interests or concerns such as symptoms of a disease). 
53 Id. 
54 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926). 
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information about a person than a search of a house would.55 Riley laid the 
groundwork of constitutional protection56 that could be expanded to wearable 
technology.57 However, the Court’s limited holding in Riley58 is merely the 
beginning of the analysis on wearable technology.59 
B. Pennsylvania’s Heightened Protection Against Intrusion 
When considering searches in the digital age, Pennsylvania courts have echoed 
the response of the Riley Court: “Get a warrant.”60 This response was not merely 
created by an obligation to follow precedent.61 Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly 
guaranteed a heightened level of privacy in the context of the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution than the U.S. Supreme 
Court.62 This guarantee is not limited to digital-age technology.63 The Pennsylvania 
Constitution, though similarly worded to the U.S. Constitution,64 has historically 
guaranteed rights under the law of search and seizure that the Fourth Amendment 
has not.65 
The test for determining whether an unreasonable search has occurred is the 
same under both Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.66 The difference is that Article I, Section 8 
implicitly extends constitutional protection to those areas where a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.67 Mere phraseology becomes inconsequential, as 
                                                          
55 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (acknowledging that “Indeed, a cellphone search would typically expose 
to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house”). 
56 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 469. 
57 Id. at 467–68. 
58 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95. 
59 Ellis, supra at note 6, at 466–67. 
60 Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407, 413 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473 (2014)). 
61 Id. 
62 Smith, supra note 29, at 557 (discussing Pennsylvania’s history of increasing rights against 
governmental intrusion); see also Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979). 
63 See Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 112 A.2d 379 (1955) (acknowledging a specific right to privacy 
before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this right in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
64 Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 627 (Pa. 2007). 
65 See Smith, supra note 29, at 557–58 (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1991); see also Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. 1990)). 
66 Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199, 1211 (Pa. 2007). 
67 In Interest of B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
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8 
Pennsylvania state courts have clearly demarcated the focus of both constitutions.68 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Constitution, with an eye for the 
wrongs done by the government, aims to deter police misconduct.69 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted that its Constitution has deep roots in 
the principles of individual liberty, and emphasizes the protection of privacy.70 These 
diverging approaches produce two different results when determining the privacy 
rights of citizens. While the U.S. Constitution gives way to an increasing number of 
situations in which the exclusionary rule does not apply,71 Article I, Section 8 
remains stalwart in its defense of privacy, protecting many areas and situations from 
governmental intrusion which are no longer recognized on the federal level.72 
The effect of Article 1, Section 8’s implicit right to privacy takes form in a 
court’s determination of reasonableness.73 As previously stated, when determining 
whether a search or seizure is unreasonable under Article I, Section 8, Pennsylvania 
courts use the same two-part test as the federal courts.74 In determining whether 
society is willing to accept a privacy interest as reasonable and legitimate, state and 
federal courts balance the weight of an individual’s privacy interests versus 
competing government interests.75 However, Pennsylvania courts have placed a 
much heavier emphasis on an individual’s privacy interest when balancing these 
                                                          
68 Commonwealth v. Hughes, 836 A.2d 893, 903 (Pa. 2003). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Pa. Soc. Serv. Union, Loc. 688 v. Commonwealth, 59 A.3d 1136, 1144 (Pa. Commw. 2012). 
72 See Smith, supra note 29, at 557–58; see also Commonwealth v. Berkheimer, 57 A.3d 171 (Pa. 
Super. 2012) (declining to follow the inevitable discovery rule in Pennsylvania); Commonwealth v. 
DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1292 (Pa. 1979) (limiting the third party exception and requiring police to seek 
a warrant for bank records); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (Pa. 1983) (granting automatic 
standing to those charged with possessory offenses); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 896 (Pa. 
1991) (declining to adopt a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule); but see Commonwealth v. 
McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 630 (Pa. 2007) (acknowledging that Pennsylvania has adopted a “limited 
automobile exception”) (emphasis added). 
73 See Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 62 A.3d 1028, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Commonwealth 
v. Beaman, 880 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa. 2005). 
74 Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 127 (Pa. 2014). 
75 Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 552 (Pa. Super. 2008). 
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9 
concerns against their competing state interests.76 Thus, Article I, Section 8 has been 
interpreted in a manner that gives greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.77 
In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made, what is 
arguably, its most astounding showing of its continued commitment to provide 
increased protections under Article 1, Section 8.78 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
examined whether adding a good faith exception to Pennsylvania’s Article I, Section 
8 would be consistent with the Commonwealth’s jurisprudence.79 Though this 
exception was present in the Federal Constitution,80 this broadens the protections of 
Article I Section 8.81 The Court established four factors that enable litigants to invoke 
the state right of privacy, both offensively and defensively, to combat excessive 
governmental intrusion.82 Conversely, the Court also allows the government to use 
the factors in Edmunds to argue for an exception to the warrant requirement.83 In 
doing so, the Court emphasized that they would look to textual, historical, 
precedential, and policy considerations that warrant greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment.84 The Court’s strong federalist philosophy85 and its continued 
commitment to safeguarding the right to privacy86 are reasons for which wearable 
technology should be protected by the warrant requirement. 
II. PENNSYLVANIA’S NEXT STEP: EXTENDING RILEY TO COVER 
WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY 
The next step for the judiciary to take in defense of Pennsylvania’s 
constitutional right to privacy, is extending the decision in Riley v. California to 
cover all high-tech, wearable devices and the data they store. Such a holding is the 
                                                          
76 See Smith, supra note 29, at 568–72 (discussing the emphasis that Pennsylvania courts have 
placed on this interest and the importance of raising privacy concerns when challenging a search and 
seizure issue). 
77 Id.; see also Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896 (creating a test to allow for areas not covered under 
federal law to be recognized as private in Pennsylvania). 
78 See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896. 
79 Id. at 894. 
80 Id. at 898. 
81 Id. at 894. 
82 Smith, supra note 29, at 580–81. 
83 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991). 
84 Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 124 (Pa. 2014) (citing Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895). 
85 Smith, supra note 29, at 567–68. 
86 See id. 
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natural antecedent of not only the jurisprudence of Pennsylvania,87 but also that of 
the Fourth Amendment in the wake of vast technological advances.88 In order to 
make a solid argument for the expansion of Riley, an Edmunds analysis and a 
discussion of the policy considerations surrounding wearable technology are 
necessary. 
A. The Factors in Edmunds Support Protecting Wearable Technology 
The first factor in Edmunds requires a consideration of the text of Article I, 
Section 8.89 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that the text in Article I, 
Section 8 is similar to that of the Fourth Amendment on numerous occasions.90 
Textual similarities between Article 1, Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment do not 
require identical interpretation.91 However, there is nothing in the text of Article 1, 
Section 8 that suggests additional protection for technological advances is warranted. 
Though this factor does not affirmatively support requiring a warrant, the remaining 
factors do require such. 
The second Edmunds factor requires a historical and precedential analysis.92 
This analysis can be difficult because wearable technology is new and does not have 
the benefit of extensive historical legal analysis or use.93 Therefore, a consideration 
of Pennsylvania’s treatment of technological advances in general may be most 
persuasive in this area. There is no question that Pennsylvania courts have strongly 
supported the constitutional right to privacy in regards to rapid advances in 
technology.94 On several occasions the courts have shown a willingness to provide 
increased protections to technological advances under Article I, Section 8.95 The 
judiciary’s willingness to provide increased protections accompanies its awareness 
                                                          
87 See id. at 33 (explaining that it has been the continuing trend of Pennsylvania to increase privacy 
rights). 
88 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2494 (2014). 
89 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 896 (Pa. 1991). 
90 Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199, 1205 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 
108, 117 (Pa. 2008) (plurality); Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (Pa. 1985). 
91 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waltson, 724 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1998). 
92 Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 125 (Pa. 2014). 
93 See Peppet, supra note 11, at 101–02 (explaining that certain wearables have come about only 
recently). 
94 See, e.g., Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. 1990); Commonwealth 
v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407 (Pa. Super. 2014); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 112 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1955). 
95 See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Murray, 223 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. 1966). 
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of the effects that technology can have in the realm of search and seizure.96 This 
ever-present cognizance of the effect technology may have on the rights of its 
citizens directly aligns with their continual granting of increased liberties and a more 
expansive right of privacy.97 Therefore, it is clear that the law in Pennsylvania has 
displayed a willingness to adjust with the change in technology over its history and 
provide increased rights where it is constitutionally necessary. 
The third Edmunds factor involves an analysis of how other jurisdictions 
address wearable technology in the context of search and seizure.98 Similar to the 
analysis of the second Edmund’s factor, a problem arises due to the minimal amount 
of cases pertaining to wearable technology. However, precedent involving high tech 
devices similar to wearable technology may be analogous or at the least persuasive, 
and provide overlapping rationales for why their wearable counterparts should be 
subject to increased privacy.99 To that end, an examination into cases involving other 
high tech devices that contain similar information may be persuasive in justifying 
the need for a warrant to search wearable technology. 
In the aftermath of Riley, other jurisdictions have exhibited mixed responses to 
increasing protections against governmental intrusion of high tech electronic 
devices.100 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted Riley broadly, 
focusing on the private nature of the contents of a cellphone.101 In doing so, the Court 
held that detained citizens have a legitimate expectation of privacy in regards to their 
electronic devices.102 In State v. Putrell, the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined 
whether a warrantless search of a probationer’s computer was lawful.103 While the 
Court did find the search lawful, it did so solely because of the petitioner’s status as 
a probationer.104 The Court held that absent these probationary restrictions, ordinary 
citizens would be protected against this type of search.105 The Court explained that 
absent probation conditions that render the device contraband, the computer holds 
                                                          
96 Smith, supra note 29, at 557–58. 
97 See id. (explaining that in light of modern intrusions the court has displayed a continued 
willingness to adjust to technology while maintaining privacy rights). 
98 Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 128 (Pa. 2014). 
99 See Saphner, supra note 1, at 1710–11. 
100 Id. at 1704. 
101 State v. Purtell, 851 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Wis. 2014). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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within itself private information about the user which are entitled to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.106 
The Indiana Court of Appeals also had an opportunity to review the warrantless 
search of an electronic device after Riley.107 In the aftermath of the landmark decision 
in Riley, the Indiana Court of Appeals examined whether the warrantless seizure of 
a GPS device was constitutionally permissible.108 The Court discussed the ability of 
the GPS to store a massive amount of data, between 16 to 28 gigabytes.109 
Additionally, the Court explained that data describing an individual’s location is 
private in nature and may reveal a plethora of details about a person’s life which they 
would not readily disclose to the public.110 The Court likened these types of devices 
to computers and cellphones due to the type of data they store and their capacity.111 
As a result, the Court held that the warrantless search of the GPS device was 
inappropriate.112 
Other states such as Florida and North Carolina have also extended Riley to 
allow for increased protections that are not afforded under the U.S. Constitution.113 
The courts in each respective state gave similar reasoning.114 Each individual court 
took caution from the analysis in Riley and held that all electronic devices are subject 
to the warrant requirement.115 Above all, these state court decisions regarding 
searching high tech storage devices focus on the storage capacity of these devices 
and the information they contain, not merely the physical device itself.116 
Some states, however, have not heeded the warnings embedded in the analysis 
in Riley and have interpreted the case narrowly.117 They have taken the high Court’s 
                                                          
106 Id. 
107 Wertz v. State, 41 N.E.3d 276, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 279. 
110 Id. at 283–84. 
111 Id. at 280. 
112 Id. at 281. 
113 See, e.g., Willis v. State, 148 So. 3d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (declining to allow a good-
faith exception for the warrantless search of a cellphone); State v. Clyburn, 770 S.E.2d 689 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2015) (holding that the protections in Riley applied to GPS devices). 
114 Willis, 148 So. 3d at 482; Clyburn, 770 S.E.2d at 694. 
115 Willis, 148 So. 3d at 482; Clyburn, 770 S.E.2d at 694. 
116 Willis, 148 So. 3d at 482; Clyburn, 770 S.E.2d at 694. 
117 See, e.g., State v. Carle, 337 P.3d 904 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (declining to extend Riley protections 
to information sent out of an electronic device); Sinclair v. State, 118 A.3d 872 (Md. 2015) (declining to 
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holding to mean that only cellphones should be subject to the warrant requirement 
and in doing so, have not addressed whether many high tech devices that currently 
exist would also be subject to the warrant requirement.118 For example, the California 
Court of Appeals declined to extend Riley to digital cameras.119 In People v. Raoult, 
the California court had the chance to examine the warrantless search of a digital 
camera found in the defendant’s car.120 The Court decided in this case that Riley 
could not be stretched to encompass cameras under the warrant requirement.121 The 
Court’s reasoning was that digital cameras do not share many of the capabilities of 
smartphones, except for their ability to take and store photos.122 Police therefore have 
a limited ability to reconstruct a person’s life by searching their digital cameras.123 
The court seems to disregard key aspects of the Riley decision, such as capacity.124 
Many other jurisdictions, despite limiting constitutional protection to cellphones, 
still acknowledge the critical privacy interests associated with devices that store 
electronic information.125 However, this narrow interpretation of Riley cannot 
possibly continue, as it would result in a chaotic outcome, leaving courts in the fog 
about how to treat these massive sources of information. 
All opinions duly noted under this factor, the Pennsylvania judiciary should 
give deference to the many states which have adopted a broad interpretation of Riley, 
and protect electronic devices in general. Wearable technology shares many key 
characteristics with cellphones and store much of the same types of personal 
information.126 Extending constitutional protection to all wearable technology means 
safeguarding vital information such as health statistics, photographs, geolocation,127 
etc. Indeed the list of information that wearable technology may become capable of 
                                                          
extend Riley to the plain view of information on a cellphone); People v. Raoult, 2d Crim. No. B256148, 
2015 WL 3874302, at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2015) (declining to extend the holding in Riley to cover 
digital cameras). 
118 Raoult, 2d Crim. No. B256148, 2015 WL 3874302, at 3. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Saphner, supra note 1, at 1703–04. 
125 See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. 2016); State v. Lowell, 364 P.3d 34 (Or. Ct. App. 
2015); In re J.E., 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
126 Saphner, supra note 1, at 1706–07. 
127 Peyton, supra note 15 (discussing capabilities of everything from connected pacemakers to apple 
watches). 
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storing in the future is infinite.128 Failing to establish broad protection for all 
wearable technology leaves a great deal of unanswered questions about how the 
courts should treat the wide variety of electronic storage devices.129 Accordingly, 
interpreting Riley narrowly would be at odds with Pennsylvania’s history of 
affording its citizens more protections against intrusion.130 
The fourth and final Edmunds factor involves an in-depth analysis of the policy 
considerations associated with searches of high tech wearable electronic devices.131 
In Commonwealth v. Stem, the Pennsylvania Superior court echoed the policy 
concerns advanced in Riley in protecting the high tech data stored on cellphones.132 
These policy concerns include the intimacy of information which is stored on 
cellphones.133 This includes health information, location data, and information about 
other aspects of life that Americans do not typically share with the public.134 The 
critical concern in Riley, which is echoed in Stem, involves balancing individual 
privacy interests with the needs of law enforcement, which include officer safety and 
preventing the destruction of evidence.135 In balancing the privacy interests of the 
cellphone owner and the needs of law enforcement, our nation’s Supreme Court and 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court both explain that the vast capacity of cellphones 
enables the user to carry around massive amounts of information which they could 
not possibly carry in their traditional paper format.136 Further, they explained that 
much of this information is traditionally kept private.137 
                                                          
128 Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackleford, Jury Glasses: Wearable Technology and Its Role 
in Crowdsourcing Justice, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 115, 117 (2015) (suggesting that advances 
in wearable technology can lead to infinite possibilities in every field from healthcare to Justice). 
129 See generally Saphner, supra note 1 (discussing the issues that a narrow interpretation poses 
towards activity trackers). 
130 See Thomas M. Hardiman, New Judicial Federalism and The Pennsylvania Experience: 
Reflections of the Edmunds Decision, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 503, 513 (citing the fact that the Pennsylvania 
constitution was adopted ten years before the ratification of the United States Constitution and that this 
historical context supports a stronger notion of privacy). 
131 Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 127 (Pa. 2014). 
132 Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407, 413 (Pa. Super. 2014). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477–78 (2014). 
136 Id.; Stem, 96 A.3d at 413. 
137 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2847. 
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There are two main justifications in asserting a need to dispense with the 
warrant requirement.138 The first justification advanced in Riley is the need to prevent 
the destruction of evidence.139 The Riley court accepted the preservation of evidence 
as a compelling issue, but held that it does not justify disregarding Fourth 
Amendment protections.140 While the government contended that there was a 
possibility of destroying data stored on cellphones from a remote location, the Court 
rejected this argument based on the ability of law enforcement to prevent remote 
wiping easily and effectively by placing the device in faraday bags.141 
The concerns in the area of search and seizure law are almost identical for 
wearable technology.142 Many wearable devices such as smart watches or Fitbits 
have the same features and abilities as cellphones, albeit in a more limited fashion.143 
Such devices function in almost the same ways as a mass storage device as they are 
carried on the consumer’s person and amass a great deal of private information.144 
Due to their near identical features, wearable devices exhibit the same possibility of 
remote wiping as with cellphones.145 But as the Supreme Court explained in Riley, 
these situations are easily dealt with, and the possibility of destruction of evidence is 
so minimal it does not justify diminishing privacy interests.146 
The second justification for dispensing with the warrant requirement is the 
compelling need to protect officers engaging in law enforcement activities.147 Similar 
to the first justification, the Riley Court held that officer safety is not a compelling 
enough reason to limit the privacy interests of cellphone users.148 The Court’s 
reasoning is simple; it is highly unlikely that a cellphone would be used to conceal a 
                                                          
138 Id. at 2483. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2486 (dismissing concerns of remote data wiping, indicating the possibility that officers 
could either turn the phone off or place them in “Faraday bags,” disabling their abilities). 
142 Saphner, supra note 1, at 1710–11. 
143 Id. at 1711–16. 
144 Id. at 1691–92. 
145 Id. (explaining that Smart phones and wearable activity trackers have similar properties and thus 
present similar concerns). 
146 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014). 
147 Id. at 2478. 
148 Id. at 2483. 
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weapon.149 Absent some extraordinary circumstance whereby the user is 
demonstrating a danger to officers or others, the cellphone cannot cause harm.150 In 
these rare situations, warrantless searches can be addressed on a case-by-case basis 
by reviewing the exigency of the situation.151 
As previously stated, wearable technology exhibits many of the same properties 
as cellphones and do not readily present danger to officers.152 Because they have the 
same properties, the same issues are present for wearable technology.153 As the Court 
explained in Riley, the concern for officer safety may be satisfied by allowing police 
to examine the physical exterior of the phone to ensure that it presents no danger to 
officers as a weapon.154 In the event a wearable device presents the immediate 
possibility of harm, the officer may seize and search the device, but absent this, a 
warrant must be obtained.155 As a result of the identical concerns, and the identical 
solutions to these concerns, wearable technology should receive the same treatment 
as cellphones. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The incredible rate at which the wearable technology market has grown 
suggests that it has become a large part of daily life.156 Similar to cellphone usage, 
Americans are now wearing cutting edge devices on them everywhere they go, 
collecting data which assists them in their daily lives.157 But the average American 
using wearable technology is unlikely to think about how stored data can be used by 
law enforcement to incriminate them. Additionally, users of wearable technology 
probably do not want their personal information disclosed to the public. As a result, 
the Pennsylvania judiciary must require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before 
searching wearable technology. The Pennsylvania judiciary has a history of 
extending Fourth Amendment protections and should continue to do so. 
                                                          
149 Id. at 2485 (“Law enforcement officers remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone 
to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden 
between the phone and its case.”). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 2494. 
152 Saphner, supra note 1, at 1710–11. 
153 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
154 Id. 
155 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
156 Lamkin, supra note 8. 
157 Kosir, supra note 2. 
